Background
The early parliamentary election of September 20, 2015 was called only eight months after the previous one was held (January 25, 2015) as the SYRIZA-Independent Greeks coalition government resigned in late August and the negotiations that followed among party leaders did not result in the formation of a new government. The resignation was triggered by the fact that the government lost its majority in the parliament, after the leftist faction of SYRIZA abandoned the party to form its own parliamentary group known as Popular Unity.
First, we briefly summarize the events that took place between the two parliamentary elections of 2015 (January 25 and September 20). In the January election, SYRIZA, a party of the radical left, won the election and elected 149 out of 300 parliament members. SYRIZA formed a post-electoral coalition with Independent Greeks, a right-wing populist party, on the basis of their anti-austerity platforms.
Together they commanded more than the required absolute majority of seats in the parliament (see Table 1 ). Independent Greeks received a small number of ministerial portfolios (e.g. its leader became the Minister of Defence) and offered continuous support to the decisions of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras regarding the most important issue during this period: the negotiations between the Greek authorities and its institutional lenders (European Central Bank, European Commission, International
Monetary Fund).
During the January campaign both SYRIZA and Independent Greeks promised that, if elected, they will annul the previous set of agreements with Greece's institutional lenders (known in Greek politics as "memorandum"). Instead, they will negotiate from scratch a new agreement with Greece's lenders.
This new agreement will have very different characteristics compared to the previous agreements, including that a) international institutions' representatives will no longer be supervising the implementation of the agreement in Greece, and b) the largest part of the Greek debt will be forgiven.
Yet, in the months that followed, Greece's institutional lenders were not willing to alter the main characteristics of the agreement, while the coalition government was not willing to step back from its pre-electoral promises. This led, in the beginning of the summer, to a deadlock between Greece and its institutional lenders which culminated in the end of June, when Greece missed its loan repayment to the IMF 1 and Greece's creditors refused to extend the second Greek bailout programme. 2 In response,
1
Technically speaking, the IMF declared Greece to be in arrears in order to avoid using the term default.
2
The programme was left to expire without the final evaluation being concluded successfully and, as a result, the final tranche was never disbursed. At the same time, a new round of negotiations between Greece and its institutional lenders concerning a third two-year bailout programme had started.
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the Prime Minister called a referendum on the topic of whether or not to accept the terms of agreement for a new bailout programme, which were presented to the Greek government by its institutional lenders during the Eurogroup meeting of June 25, 2015 -himself endorsing a "No" vote.
The announcement of the referendum led to an immediate imposition of capital controls -some of them still apply (e.g. in January 2016 there was still a weekly 420 euros limit on all cash withdrawals). This, in turn, intensified the recession dynamics (European Commission 2015a , 2015b that followed Greece's half-a-year long denial to accept its lenders' terms.
3 The outcome of the referendum was against Greece accepting the terms of its institutional lenders. 4 A week later, at an EU Summit of Heads of States, where the future of Greece in the Eurozone was at stake, the Greek Prime
Minister agreed to the terms, proposed by Greece's institutional lenders, for a third bailout programme.
In the weeks that followed the capitulation of the Greek Prime Minister, many SYRIZA MPs resigned from the party but kept their seats in parliament. This resulted in the SYRIZA led coalition government losing its parliamentary majority. Despite the coalition losing its majority, the agreement that was concluded between the Greek government and its institutional lenders was introduced by the government to the parliament for approval. 
Electoral rule
In Greek parliamentary elections all citizens of age eighteen and above have the right to vote. The ballot is secret and, essentially, voluntary. Strictly speaking, the Constitution stated that voting is compulsory and that the exact penalty for someone abstaining will be specified by a common law. The latter provision was eliminated following the 2001 constitutional amendment. Ever since it has become lex imperfecta and, hence, potential laws that determine punishments have no constitutional
3
In its winter (February 5, 2015) economic forecast the European Commission projected that the Greek economy will grow by 2.5% in 2015, and by an additional 3.6% in 2016, compared to an anaemic growth rate of only 0.8% in 2014. By contrast, in its autumn forecast (November 5, 2015) , following the imposition of capital controls in June, the Commission projected that the Greek economy will slide back to recession, shrinking by 1.4% and 1.3% in 2015 and 2016 respectively, and will only return to growth by mid-2017.
4
The "No" vote gained 61%.
M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
grounds to be applied. On the ballot paper each party presented an ordered list of candidates. The election took place under a closed-list system. That is, voters could not express preferences over the ranking of candidates. This is a particular feature of the electoral rule -which otherwise specifies an open-list system-that was applied for the first time: when an election takes place within a year of the previous one, party-lists have to be closed.
The current electoral law (3636/2008) is a modified PR-system with a plurality premium and, hence, it is rather disproportional in favour of the plurality winner. A total of 300 seats are allocated to all parties that surpass the three percent electoral threshold; 250 seats are distributed among all parties in a proportional manner while the remaining 50 seats are awarded to the plurality winner party as a bonus. Most MPs are elected from electoral district lists (288) and the rest (12) from nation-wide party lists. A small number of electoral districts (7) elect a unique MP. In the remaining districts, seats are attributed to the competing parties as proportionally as possible with the following exception: the 50-seat plurality bonus is not allocated from a separate list, rather it is allocated by reserving some seats in multi-member districts for the winning party irrespective of its electoral performance in that particular district. This, obviously, creates sometimes strong distortions in representation. was SYRIZA who opposed such a reform.
Main Issues, Contenders and Campaigns
The early election of September 20, 2015 was triggered by the fact that the governing coalition lost its support in parliament -even falling below the necessary threshold (120 MPs) required for a minority government-as a result of its decision, in July, to agree to a third bailout programme -and further austerity-with Greece's institutional lenders. Naturally, therefore, the issue that almost exclusively dominated the electoral campaign was related to the third bailout programme and its implementation.
An additional issue made its appearance during the campaign: the refugee crisis and the uncontrolled influx of refugees and migrants from the Turkish mainland to many Greek islands. The issue was An additional notable feature of the election campaign was the explicit pledge by the ruling SYRIZA party to enter in a coalition only with its preferred partner the Independent Greeks despite all polls suggesting that this was not a likely outcome -in all polls, the party of Independent Greeks was consistently failing to clear the 3% entry barrier. On the other hand, the main opposition party of New Democracy pledged to seek the support of SYRIZA in forming a grand-coalition even in the event that it won the election. The centrist parties of PASOK and Potami signalled their desire to coalesce with the winner -be it SYRIZA or New Democracy-on the basis of a programmatic agreement that did not risk Greece's place into the Eurozone.
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Results
The election, which was held with closed-lists for the first time, produced a result very similar to that of January 2015: the incumbent coalition secured again a majority in the parliament (155 seats) and was able to hold on to power. The election result (Table 1) was marked by five main elements: the clear victory of SYRIZA despite all polls predicting a very tight race, the failure of Popular Unity -SYRIZA's splinter party-to enter parliament, the success of the Independent Greeks in securing their representation in the new parliament, the record-high level of abstention, and finally, the remarkable resilience of the far-right party of Golden Dawn which scored moderate gains across the country -and considerable ones in the islands (e.g. Kos, Lesvos, Leros and Samos) affected by the refugee crisis (Fig. 1) . Remarkably, the vote shares that the two main contenders (SYRIZA and New Democracy) received were not very different from those received in January (Table 1 ). The same is also true for almost all other parties with two notable exceptions: the centrist party Potami saw its support decrease by two percentage points while the centre-left PASOK saw its support going up by the same amount.
Yet, in terms of absolute votes cast, all parties -but for PASOK and Centrist Union-saw a decrease in their support (Table 1 ). This was due to the record-high levels of voter abstention. As a result, the decline in turnout offset the decline in the absolute amount of votes that each party received and, hence, it did not result in a dramatic change in the distribution of seats in the new parliament (Table   1) .
Moreover, turnout and abstention followed specific regional patterns in this election. As we show in Table 2 , urban and metropolitan regions (e.g. Athens, Thessaloniki, Piraeus, Achaia and Heraklion) recorded the sharpest decline in voter turnout compared to the January 2015 elections. Moreover, the regions with the sharpest differential decrease in turnout tend to be SYRIZA strongholds (Fig. 2 ).
There are many potential explanations for this pattern: electoral fatigue due to the high frequency with which people were called to the polls, or decreased pivotality in electorally safe districts (see Tukiainen and Lyytikainen 2013 ). Yet, a crucial element behind this pattern seems to be the fact that some of SYRIZA's January 2015 voters chose to abstain either due to disappointment by the party's capitulation to the creditor's terms or because they were indifferent between the two main contenders that converged and adopted very similar political platforms (see Matakos et al. 2015) .
Effects
The outcome of the election was a clear reaffirmation of Prime Minister Tsipras' mandate to continue to govern in collaboration with his coalition partner Independent Greeks. In fact, this was the first election in the years following the break-out of the economic crisis -and the imposition of austerity programmes-that an incumbent government was not defeated in the polls after signing a bailout agreement with the EU institutions (the fate of the Papandreou and Samaras cabinets who agreed to the first and second bailouts was sealed by such agreements). In a clear sign of continuity, the Prime Minister appointed to almost all key cabinet positions (i.e. Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, Minister of Economy, Minister of Defence, Minister for Foreign Affairs, etc.) the same M A N U S C R I P T
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individuals that occupied them before the resignation of the previous SYRIZA-Independent Greeks coalition government. As a result, negotiations for the formation of a coalition between SYRIZA and Independent Greeks were concluded within a day. The new coalition government now commands a majority of 155 MPs, down from a majority of 162 in the previous parliament. Thus it is not an exaggeration to say that in this election, and despite previous experience, retrospective voting did not seem to be in operation (see also Dinas et al. 2015) . In spite of the imposition of capital controlswhich resulted in a significant decrease in economic activity (European Commission 2015b)-voters decided not to punish the two coalition partners: they jointly lost only about two percentage points and seven seats. This pattern is strengthened further by the fact that Popular Unity, consisting of ex-SYRIZA MPs and cabinet ministers who resigned in disagreement to the third bailout, failed to clear the 3% barrier and enter parliament.
Moreover, the election result was also a clear reaffirmation of the pro-EU orientation of Greece: the combined vote share of all pro-EU parties which supported the third bailout programme in August 2015 exceeded 80 percent. As a result, the mandate of the government to swiftly implement the agreement with the EU institutions was reinforced further. Therefore, it came as no surprise that the Prime Minister has set the implementation of the agreement as the top priority of his government during the first cabinet meeting. On the negative side, the remarkable resilience of the far-right, xenophobic, and anti-EU party of Golden Dawn -which secured its parliamentary representation for a fourth time in a row, finishing third as it did in January 2015-casts a shadow on the, otherwise, strong support that all pro-EU parties received in this election. Matakos, Konstantinos, and D. Xefteris (2015b) . "Citizens or Clients? Evidence on opportunistic voting from a natural experiment in Greece," forthcoming in Political Science Research and Methods: The Journal of the European Political Science Association. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10. /psrm.2015 Matakos, Konstantinos, O. Troumpounis, and D. Xefteris (2015) . 
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